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Abstract
A substantial empirical literature documents the rise in wage inequality in the American economy. 
It is silent on whether the increase in inequality is due to components of earnings that are 
predictable by agents or whether it is due to greater uncertainty facing them. These two sources of 
variability have different consequences for both aggregate and individual welfare. Using data on 
two cohorts of American males we find that a large component of the rise in inequality for less 
skilled workers is due to uncertainty. For skilled workers, the rise is less pronounced.
1 Introduction
A large literature documents an increase in wage inequality in the American economy over 
the past 40 years. This increase in wage inequality occurred both within and across 
education-experience groups. (See, e.g., the surveys in Katz and Autor, 1999, and Acemoglu 
and Autor, 2011).
Variability in wages across people and over time for the same people is not necessarily the 
same as uncertainty in wages. Some of the variability may be due to predictable components 
observed by agents early in their adult lives but not observed by the analyst. Cunha, 
Heckman, and Navarro (2005), henceforth CHN, estimate that roughly half of all variability 
in lifetime earnings across people is due to uncertainty as perceived at the time they make 
college-going decisions. They estimate uncertainty for one cohort of workers.1 In this paper, 
we apply their methodology to estimate how much of the recent increase in wage inequality 
over the later 20th century is due to an increase in components predictable by the agents at 
the age they make their college attendance decisions and how much is due to components 
that are unpredictable at that age.
A large literature in empirical labor economics starting with the pioneering work of 
Friedman and Kuznets (1945) uses panel data to decompose earnings into permanent and 
1Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate that 90% of lifetime variability is predictable by young adults. Johnson (2013) reports estimates 
consistent with those reported in CHN.
HHS Public Access
Author manuscript
J Labor Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 October 01.
Published in final edited form as:
J Labor Econ. 2016 April ; 34(Suppl 2): s31–s65. doi:10.1086/684121.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
transitory components. This literature has developed rich descriptions of earnings dynamics.
2
 Using such statistical decompositions, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994, 2009) document an 
increase in measured earnings instability in recent decades. The variance of transitory 
components greatly increases from the period 1970–1978 to the period 1979–1987. 
However, purely statistical decompositions cannot distinguish uncertainty from other 
sources of variability. Transitory components as measured by a statistical decomposition 
may be perfectly predictable by agents, partially predictable, or totally unpredictable.
This paper uses data on schooling choices and realized future earnings for two birth cohorts 
of white males spanning the mid-1960s to the mid-2000s to estimate the evolution of 
uncertainty in the labor market. We show that unforecastable components in labor income 
have increased in recent years, especially for less skilled workers. Our findings support the 
analysis of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2008) that turbulence has increased in unskilled 
labor markets. This increase is not revealed in traditional measures of earnings inequality 
which do not distinguish between predictable and unpredictable components.
Our approach is based on the following simple idea. A decision variable C1, say 
consumption of an agent in the first period of life, may depend on incomes Y1, …, YT over 
horizon T that are realized after the consumption choice is taken. Abstracting from 
measurement errors, under the permanent income hypothesis the correlation between C1 and 
future Yt is a measure of how much of future Yt is known and acted on when agents make 
their consumption decisions. (See, e.g., Flavin, 1981.)
Agents only imperfectly predict their future earnings using information set . Suppose that 
C1 depends on future Yt only through expected present value, , where “E” 
denotes expectation, , and ρ is the discount rate. This framework 
assumes that there is an asset market in which agents can lend or borrow against verifiable 
future income. If, after the choice of C1 is made, we actually observe Y1, …, YT, we can 
construct PV ex-post. If the information set is properly specified, the residual corresponding 
to the component of PV that is not forecastable in the first period, , 
should not predict C1.  is predictable. V1 arises from uncertainty. The variance 
in PV1 that is unpredictable using  is a measure of uncertainty as of the first period3.
This paper uses college attendance choices as its decision variable to estimate uncertainty. 
Accordingly, we measure uncertainty at only one stage of the life cycle. In principle, we 
could use decisions at later stages to chart the evolution of information over the life cycle but 
we do not do so in this paper.4 Following Becker (1964), college choices depend on 
comparisons of earnings in the schooling level chosen and in alternative states.
2See, e.g., Haider (2001); Jensen and Shore (2011); Meghir and Pistaferri (2004, 2011).
3The Sims (1972) test for noncausality is based on a related idea in a linear prediction framework. Whereas Sims tests whether future 
Yt predict current C1, we measure what fraction of future Yt predict current C1 and use a more general prediction process.4In other work (Cunha and Heckman, 2011), we use annual labor supply to estimate information sets at multiple stages of the life 
cycle.
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We modify the simple procedure just described to account for measurement error and the 
economists' inability to measure expected earnings in schooling states not selected by 
agents. We account for the resulting selection bias in measuring earnings in any state that 
arises when we only observe earnings streams for a given educational level only for people 
who select into that level (see, e.g., Heckman, 1976, 1979; Willis and Rosen, 1979).
Using college choice data combined with earnings data and data on test scores, we find that 
both predictable and unpredictable components of earnings variance have increased in recent 
years. The increase in uncertainty is largely microeconomic in nature, and is much greater 
for unskilled workers. Macroeconomic uncertainty decreased over the period studied (which 
predates the 2008 downturn), especially for less skilled workers. For them, roughly 60% of 
the increase in wage variability within schooling groups is due to micro uncertainty 
associated with turnover and job loss. For more skilled workers, only 8% of the increase in 
inequality is due to uncertainty. Roughly 26% of the increase in the variance of returns to 
schooling is due to increased uncertainty.
The rest of this paper is in three parts. Part 2 summarizes the strategy used to obtain our 
estimates. It is based on the analysis of CHN and Cunha and Heckman (2008).5 Part 3 
presents and interprets our empirical analysis. Part 4 concludes.
2 The Model
To identify the forecastable components of future earnings and how they have changed over 
time, we draw on the analysis of CHN and Cunha and Heckman (2008), which we briefly 
summarize.
2.1 Earnings Equations
Using the Roy model (1951) and its generalizations (see Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007a,b), 
agents possess two lifetime potential earnings streams, (Y0,t, Y1,t), t = 1, …, T, for schooling 
levels “0” and “1” respectively. Earnings are assumed to have finite means. For conditioning 
variables X, we write:
(1)
(2)
where the error terms Us,t are defined to satisfy E (Us,t | X) = 0, s = 0, 1, t = 1, …, T. 
Allowing for age-specific returns incorporates post-school investment as a determinant of 
earnings. For any individual, we only observe one of the two possible earnings streams. This 
is the standard switching regression model (Quandt, 1958, 1972).
5A Web Appendix presents semiparametric proofs of identification based on their work.
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2.2 Choice Equations
The human capital model of Becker (1964) is based on present value income maximization. 
We extend that model by assuming that agents are risk neutral and make schooling choices 
based on maximizing the expected value of the return to schooling given information set . 
Write the index I of the difference in present values as
(3)
where C is the cost of attending college. Costs include both pecuniary and psychic costs, 
which may or may not be fully known at the time schooling decisions are made. Psychic 
costs play an important role in explaining college enrollment decisions (see, e.g., Carneiro, 
Hansen, and Heckman, 2003, Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante, 2013, and Eisenhauer, 
Heckman, and Mosso, 2015). Let Z and UC denote, respectively, the directly measured and 
unmeasured (by the analyst) determinants of costs respectively. We assume that costs can be 
written as
(4)
Defining
and
and substituting in (1), (2), and (4) into decision rule (3) we obtain
(5)
 is the error term in the choice equation and it may or may not include U1,t, U0,t, 
or UC, depending on what is in the agent's information set. Similarly, μI(X, Z) may only be 
based on expectations of future X and Z at the time schooling decisions are made. People go 
to college if the expected present value of earnings is positive:
(6)
2.3 Cognitive Ability
In estimating our model and decomposing realized earnings into forecastable and 
unforecastable components, we control for cognitive ability. Cognitive ability is known to 
affect both earnings and college choices. (See, e.g., Chamberlain and Griliches, 1975; 
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Taubman, 1977). We have access to data on scores on tests of cognitive ability.6 Let Mk 
denote an agent's score on the kth test. Assume that the Mk have finite means and can be 
expressed in terms of conditioning variables XM. Write
(7)
Test scores facilitate but are not essential to our identification strategy. They enable us to 
proxy unobserved components of ability that affect earnings and schooling choices.
2.4 Heterogeneity and Uncertainty
The earnings of agents of schooling level s at age t can be decomposed into predictable and 
unpredictable components as of period 1:
 is available to the agent to help predict schooling choices. It is a component of 
realized earnings. The component Vs,t does not enter the schooling choice equation because 
it is unknown at the time schooling decisions are made. However, it determines realized 
earnings.
To determine which components are in the information set of the agent, we need to 
determine which specification of the information set  best characterizes the dependence 
between schooling choices and future earnings. CHN and Cunha and Heckman (2008) use 
factor structure approximations to the error terms to decompose earnings residuals into 
predictable and unpredictable components. Other approximations such as ARMA models 
might be used (see, e.g., MaCurdy, 1982, 2007). However, factor structures are 
computationally and conceptually convenient and can approximate general error processes 
(see Heckman, 1981). There is an extensive literature on their identification and estimation 
(see, e.g., Abbring and Heckman, 2007; Chamberlain and Griliches, 1975). One advantage 
of factor models is that they enable analysts to partition realized earnings into orthogonal 
components. Some of these components may be known by the agent when schooling choices 
are made and some components may not be known. By factor analyzing earnings and choice 
equations we can determine which components (factors) of realized earnings appear in the 
choice equations. To show this, following CHN, we introduce an explicit factor structure for 
the disturbance terms.
2.5 Factor Models
We now present our factor model, starting with the earnings and choice equations. We 
decompose the error terms in the earnings equations into factors and idiosyncratic error 
terms. Let factors and factor loadings be θ = (θ1, …, θK) and αs,t = (α1,s,t, …, αK,s,t), 
respectively. The idiosyncratic error terms, εs,t, s ∈ {0, 1}, t ∈ {1, ⋯, T}, affect only the 
period-t, schooling-s earnings equation. The εs,t are mutually independent and independent 
6See Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz (2011) for a discussion of cognitive tests.
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of θ, X and Z. The factors, in turn, are assumed to be independent of X, Z.7 We assume that 
U0,t and U1,t can be represented in factor-structure form:
(8)
We assume that factors are mutually independent and independent of X and εs,t for all s, t. 
The εℓ,t, ℓ = 0, 1 and t = 1, …, T, are mutually independent.
The equation for psychic and pecuniary cost is decomposed in a fashion similar to the 
earnings equations, so that (4) can be written as
(9)
where εC is independent of θ, X, Z, εs,t, s = 0, 1, t = 1, …, T. Given the factor representation 
(8) and (9), we can represent the choice index I for schooling as
(10)
where we define
2.5.1 Test Score Equations—Following a long tradition in the literature (see, e.g., the 
papers in Taubman, 1977), we include measures of ability in the earnings and choice 
equations. Let the first component of θ, θ1, correspond to cognitive ability. It is extracted 
from data on test scores. There are additional errors unique to test score equation k, . In 
this notation, we can write equation (7) as
(11)
where the  are “factor loadings”, i.e., coefficients that map θ1 into Mk, and the  are 
mutually independent “uniquenesses” independent of all other right hand side variables. 
Modeling test scores in this fashion recognizes that they are noisy measures of cognitive 
ability.8 While we do not require test scores to identify the model (see, e.g., Abbring and 
Heckman, 2007) they facilitate identification, allow us to give a specific interpretation to one 
component of θ, and link our analysis to a large literature in labor economics and the 
economics of education.
7Alternatively, we can interpret the factors as residualized versions of θ controlling for X and Z.
8Applying the analyses of Schennach (2004) and Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), identification of the model can be secured 
under much weaker conditions.
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2.6 The Estimation of Predictable Components of Future Earnings
We now illustrate how to apply the method of CHN to determine which components of 
realized earnings are known to the agent when schooling choices are made. For full details 
on the econometrics used to extract the estimates reported in this paper see CHN, Abbring 
and Heckman (2007), and Cunha and Heckman (2008). For expositional simplicity, in this 
section alone we assume that X, Z, βs,t (s = 0, 1, t = 1, …, T) and εC are in the information 
set .9 To fix ideas, suppose that there are two factors, θ1 (ability) and θ2. In the empirical 
work reported below we use more factors and find that 3 are required to fit the data.
Suppose that it is claimed that both θ1 and θ2 are known by the agent when schooling 
choices are made but the εs,t are not, i.e. , but  for all s and t. If this is 
true, the index function governing schooling choices is
(12)
Using standard results in the theory of discrete choice (see Matzkin, 1992, or Heckman and 
Vytlacil, 2007a, for precise conditions), we can proceed as if we observe I in equations (6) 
and (12) up to an unknown positive scale. Thus from the discrete choices on schooling we 
observe the index generating the choices up to scale. From the correlation between S and 
realized incomes, we can form (up to scale) the covariance between I and Ys,t, t = 1, …, T 
for s = 0 or 1. Conditional on X, Z this covariance is
(13)
Suppose next that θ2 is not known, or is known and not acted on by the agent when 
schooling choices are made. In this case, α2,I = 0. If neither θ2 nor θ1 is known, or acted on 
by the agent, α1,I = α2,I = 0. For panels of earnings histories of length 3 or more (T ≥ 3) and 
with three or more measures of cognition (K ≥ 3), we can use the system of covariances in 
(13) joined with the information from the covariances between Mk and I and Mk and Ys,t to 
identify the model and infer the number of factors.
CHN, Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006), Abbring and Heckman (2007), and Cunha and 
Heckman (2008) present the details on how to use the covariances among schooling, test 
scores, and earnings to identify the factor loadings and the distribution of the factors in test 
score and earnings equations (11), (8), and (9) using self-selected samples.10 Self selection 
arises because analysts only observe the earnings stream associated with s for persons who 
choose s. The cited papers establish conditions for identifying , , α1,s,t and α2,s,t, s = 0, 
1, t = 1, …, T. We review their conditions in the Web Appendix.11
Putting these ingredients together, we can determine which components (factors) that 
determine realized earnings and the test scores are correlated with I. If component (factor) θ1 
9In our empirical analysis, we test for the presence or absence of components in X, Z, and the εs,t that are in ex-ante information sets.10In our Web Appendix, we restate their formal proofs of identification. They identify the distributions of factors nonparametrically. 
Test score data are not strictly required to secure identification. See, e.g., Abbring and Heckman (2007).
11See Part 3 of the Web Appendix.
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appears in the period t earnings equation (α1,s,t ≠ = 0) is correlated with I and is acted on by 
the agent in making schooling choices (so α1,I ≠ = 0), then θ1 is predictable (in ) as of the 
time schooling decisions are being made. If earnings component θ2 is uncorrelated with I, 
then α2,I = 0 and θ2 is not acted on by the agent in making schooling choices and we say that 
it is unpredictable at the time schooling choices are made.12
3 Empirical Results
In order to study the evolution of uncertainty and inequality in labor earnings in the U.S. 
economy, we analyze and compare two demographically comparable, temporally separated 
samples. We study white males born between 1957 and 1964, sampled in the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY/1979).13 We also study an earlier sample of white 
males born between 1941 and 1952, surveyed in the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS/
1966).14 In what follows, we refer to the samples as NLSY/1979 and NLS/1966, 
respectively. These data are described in detail in the Web Appendix.15 Because we only 
analyze white males, we do not present a comprehensive investigation of the increase in 
inequality in the U.S. arising from all within-group and between-group comparisons. 
However, in focusing on white males, we can abstract from influences that operate 
differentially on various demographic groups. We focus on the rise of inequality that is due 
to forecastable versus unforecastable components for one important demographic group.16
We analyze two schooling choices: high school and college graduation. Use s = 0 to denote 
those who stop at high school and s = 1 to denote those who graduate college. We present 
descriptive statistics on the NLSY/1979 and NLS/1966 samples, in the Web Appendix 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 respectively. In both samples, college graduates have higher test scores, 
fewer siblings and parents with higher levels of education than those who stop at high 
school. In the NLSY/1979, college graduates are more likely to live in locations where the 
tuition for four-year college is lower. This is not true for the college graduates in NLS/
1966.17
We analyze the evolution of labor income from ages 22 to 36. Reliable data are not available 
after that age for the NLS/1966 sample. Thus we study earnings over the years 1963–1988 
for the NLS/1966 sample and the years 1979–2005 for the NSLY sample. Web appendix 
(Figures 1.1 and 1.2) display, respectively, the mean earnings by age of high school and 
12CHN interpret the factor loadings in the earnings equations as prices of unobserved skills that they interpret as factors. In this paper 
we do not adopt that interpretation. We allow agents to be uncertain about their future skills, future prices, or both. We interpret the 
factor loadings as convenient statistical devices for representing the components of realized earnings no matter what their source. Thus 
we do not maintain the perfect foresight assumption about future skill prices used by CHN.
13See Miller (2004) for a description of the NLSY data.
14See documentation at http://www.bls.gov/nls/handbook/2005/nlshc6.pdf for a description of the NLS data.
15http://jenni.uchicago.edu/evo-earn/. The Web Appendix has five parts: Web Appendix 1 contains a description of the samples; Web 
Appendix 2 presents a description of the estimated model, including the goodness of fit tests; Web Appendix 3 provides a review on 
the identification of the model; Web Appendix 3.5 discusses the estimates of the joint distribution of outcomes; Web Appendix 3.6 
presents the results of the schooling choice on our measures of aggregate inequality.
16In this paper, we do not take a position on the sources of predictable variability or uncertainty. The former might come from cost of 
living differentials (e.g., Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor, 2009; Moretti, 2013) or from variance arising from life cycle investment (see 
Mincer, 1974 or Lemieux, 2006). Both components could have changed as the labor market became more demographically diverse 
and the white males we study faced increasing competition. Katz and Autor (1999) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) discuss other 
factors contributing to the observed rise in wage inequality.
17See Cameron and Heckman (2001) for details on the construction of our tuition variables.
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college graduates for NLSY/1979 and NLS/1966.18 In both data sets and for both cohorts, 
college graduates start off with lower mean labor income than high school graduates but 
overtake them. This is consistent with the analysis of Mincer (1974). The appendix also 
plots the standard deviation of earnings by age for high school graduates and college 
graduates for both cohorts.19 The standard deviation of earnings increases with age for high 
school and college graduates in both data sets. The standard deviation of earnings by age is 
uniformly greater in the later cohort, for both high school and college graduates. Thus our 
data are consistent with a vast literature documenting the increase in inequality of earnings.
Both data sets have measures of cognitive test scores that can be used to proxy ability.20 For 
the NLSY/1979, we use five components of the ASVAB test battery: arithmetic reasoning, 
word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, math knowledge and coding speed. We 
dedicate the first element of θ (θ1) to this test score system, and exclude other factors from 
it, so θ1 is a measure of cognitive ability.
In the NLS/1966 there are many different achievement tests, but in our empirical work we 
use the two most commonly reported ones: the OTIS/BETA/GAMMA and the California 
Test of Mental Maturity (CTMM). One problem with the NLS/1966 sample is that there are 
no respondents for whom we observe scores from two or more achievement tests. That is, 
for each respondent we observe at most one test score. We supplement the information from 
these test scores by using additional proxies for cognitive achievement.21
We model the test score j,Mj, by equation (11). The covariates XM include family 
background variables, year of birth dummies, and characteristics of the individuals at the 
time of the test.22 To set the scale of θ1, we normalize . Using factor models, instead 
of working directly with test scores, recognizes that test scores may be noisy measures of 
cognitive skills.
Salient features of our data are presented in Table 1. Fewer males graduate college in the 
later cohort. This is consistent with a large body of evidence that shows enhanced college 
participation in earlier cohorts to avoid the Vietnam War draft.23 For a variety of 
specifications, Mincer returns increase for the later cohorts. This is consistent with a large 
18Earnings figures are adjusted for inflation using the CPI and we take the year 2000 as the base year.
19See Web Appendix Figures 1.3 and 1.4 respectively.
20M in the notation of section 2.
21We use information from three different tests from the “Knowledge of the World of Work” survey. The first is a question regarding 
occupation: the respondent is asked about the duties of a given profession, say draftsman. For this specific example, there are three 
possible answers: (a) makes scale drawings of products or equipment for engineering or manufacturing purposes, (b) mixes and serves 
drinks in a bar or tavern, (c) pushes or pulls a cart in a factory or warehouse. The second test is a test that asks for each occupation in 
the first test, the level of education associated with that occupation. The third test is an earnings comparison test. Specifically, it asks 
the respondent who he/she believes makes more in a year, comparing two different occupations. In Web Appendix Table 2.1 we show 
that even after controlling for parental education, number of siblings, urban residence at age 14, and dummies for year of birth, the 
“Knowledge of the World of Work” test scores are correlated with the cognitive test scores. The correlation with OTIS/BETA/
GAMMA and CTMM is stronger for the occupation and education tests than for the earnings-comparison test.
22In our analyses of both the NLSY/1979 and NLS/1966 data we include mother's education, father's education, number of siblings, 
urban residence at age 14, dummies for year effects and an intercept. In the NLSY/1979 sample we also control for whether the test 
taker is enrolled in school and the highest grade completed at the time of the test. In the NLS/1966 all of the respondents were enrolled 
in school at the time of the test (in fact, the test score is obtained in a survey from schools). We do not know the highest grade 
completed at the time of the test for the NLS/1966 sample.
23See, e.g., Heckman and LaFontaine (2010).
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body of evidence on the returns to schooling (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Katz and Autor, 
1999).
Qualitatively similar models characterize both samples. For both cohorts, a three factor 
model is sufficient to fit the data on ex-post earnings, test scores and schooling choice.24 
The identification of the model requires the normalization of some factor loadings because 
the scales of the components of θ are otherwise indeterminate. Web Appendix Table 2.2 
shows the factor loading normalizations imposed in both data sets. In both samples, the 
covariates X are urban residence at age 14, year effects, and an intercept.
The covariates Z in the cost function are urban residence at age 14, dummies for year of 
birth, and variables that affect the costs of going to college but do not affect outcomes Ys,t 
after controlling for ability. Examples of such exclusions are mother's education, father's 
education, number of siblings, and local tuition.25 Because in both samples we only have 
earnings data into the middle 30s, the truncated discounted earnings after the periods of 
observation (denoted t = 1, …, T*) are absorbed into the definition of expected C in equation 
(3). Thus C estimated from the choice equation is not a pure measure of costs. We discuss 
this issue further in Section 3.3.
Each factor θk is assumed to be generated by a mixture of Jk normal distributions,
where ϕ (η | μj, λj) is a normal density for η with mean μj and variance λj and , 
and pk,j > 0.26 The εs,t are also assumed to be generated by mixtures of normals. We 
estimate the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods as described in Carneiro, 
Hansen, and Heckman (2003). For all factors, a four-component model (Jk = 4, k = 1, …, 3) 
is adequate. For all εs,t we use a three-component model.27
The dependent variable in our analysis is earnings and not log earnings. Under risk 
neutrality, agents make college choices based on expected earnings. The traditional 
argument for fitting log earnings is based on goodness of fit considerations.28 Using a 
nonparametric estimation method for determining the error distribution, our model fits the 
earnings data.
24In the next subsection and at our website, we discuss the goodness-of-fit measures used to select the appropriate model for each 
sample.
25Because we control for ability and other unobservables captured by the factors, our parsimonious specification of the earnings 
equations is less controversial.
26Ferguson (1983) shows that mixtures of normals with a large number of components approximate any distribution of θk arbitrarily 
well in the ℓ1 norm.
27Additional components do not improve the goodness of fit of the model to the data.
28See Heckman and Polachek (1974).
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3.1 Model Fit
The Web Appendix reports model fit overall and in subsamples disaggregated by education 
and age.29 When we perform formal tests of equality of predicted versus actual densities, we 
pass these tests for both schooling groups for most ages.30 The model fits the NLS/1966 
data marginally better than it fits the NLSY/1979 data. The estimated factor distributions are 
non-normal.31
Our analysis reveals that agents know θ1 and θ2 but not θ3 at the time that they make their 
schooling decisions. Thus the third factor is revealed after schooling choices are made. In 
addition, they do not know the εs,t, s = 0, 1, t = 1, …, T*, or the year dummies in the 
earnings equations corresponding to future macro shocks. Otherwise agents know the 
variables in X and Z described in the previous subsection.
3.2 The Evolution of Joint Distributions of Earnings and the Returns to College
The conventional approach to estimating the distribution of earnings in counterfactual 
schooling states (e.g., the distributions of college earnings for people who choose to be high 
school graduates under a particular policy regime) assumes that college and high school 
distributions are the same except for an additive constant — the coefficient of a schooling 
dummy in an earnings regression conditioned on covariates. Using the methods developed in 
CHN and reviewed in Part III of the Web Appendix, we can identify both ex-ante and ex-
post joint distributions without making this strong assumption or the other strong 
assumptions conventionally used to identify joint distributions of counterfactuals.32 We 
present and discuss our estimates of ex-ante and ex-post joint distributions in Web Appendix 
3.5.
Knowledge of the joint distributions allows analysts to compare factual with counterfactual 
distributions. In the Web Appendix, we compare the density of the present value of realized 
ex-post earnings in the high school sector for high school graduates with the density of the 
present value of earnings they would obtain in the college sector. We also compare the 
density of realized present value earnings of college graduates with the density of their 
counterfactual present value of earnings in the high school sector.33 For both data sets, the 
high school attenders would have higher earnings if they had chosen to be college graduates. 
For college graduates, the densities of high school present value of earnings are to the left of 
the college densities. These distributions are consistent with economic rationality because 
estimated psychic costs are estimated to be substantially negative for college attendees and 
large and positive for those who stop at high school. See the evidence reported in CHN.34
29The Web Appendix shows fits for all ages. See Web Appendix Figures 2.1 through 2.90 for the overall, high school, and college 
earnings, for both the NLSY/1979 and NLS/1966.
30See Web Appendix Table 2.3.
31Figures 2.97–2.102 plot the estimated densities of the factors for the NLS 1966 and 1979 NLSY samples by attained schooling 
level.
32Abbring and Heckman (2007) discuss a variety of alternative assumptions used to identify joint counterfactual distributions.
33See Figures 2.91–2.92 for high school and college earnings, respectively for the NLSY/1979 cohort and Figures 2.94–2.95 for the 
corresponding figures for the NLS/1966 cohort.
34This is a recurrent finding in the literature. See Abbott, Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2013) and Eisenhauer, Heckman, and 
Mosso (2015).
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From our model, we can generate the distributions of the ex-post gross rate of return R to 
college (excluding costs) defined as
where
where t ∈ {1, …, 15} corresponding to discounting earnings to age 22 over the period from 
age 22 to age 36, (T* = 15) and ρ = .03. The mean high school student would have had 
annual gross returns per year of schooling of around 6% for a college education in the earlier 
cohort and around 9.5% for the later cohort. (See Table 2.) For the mean college graduate, 
the annual return per year of schooling is around 8.7% for the earlier cohort and 13.5% for 
the later cohort. For individuals at the margin of attending college, these figures are 7.5% 
and 11.8% respectively. The returns to college for high school and college graduates for both 
cohorts are plotted in Figure 1.
3.3 The Evolution of Uncertainty and Heterogeneity
Under risk neutrality, the valuation or net utility function for schooling is
where
Because of the age truncation of lifetime earnings in our data, the estimated cost includes a 
component due to the expected return realized after period T*. Individuals go to college if I 
> 0. As previously explained, the correlation between schooling choices and realized future 
income allows the analyst to disentangle predictable components from uncertainty. For both 
cohorts, we test, and do not reject, the hypothesis that at the time they make college going 
decisions individuals know their Z and the factors θ1 and θ2. They do not know the time 
dummies (year effects) in X, the factor θ3 or εs,t, s = 0, 1, t = 1, …, T*, at the time they make 
their educational choices. We now explore the implications of our estimates for the growth 
of uncertainty in the American economy prior to the 2008 recession.
3.3.1 Total Residual Variance and Variance of Unforecastable Components—
The unforecastable component of the residual is the sum of the components that are not in 
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the information set of the agent at the time schooling choices are made. For both data sets, 
the unforecastable component of the present value of earnings estimates up to age T* is
(14)
where the  are the year dummies in the future earnings equations that we estimate to be 
unknown to agents at the time they make their schooling choices. The variance of the 
unforecastable component in the present value of earnings up to age T* for schooling level s 
is Var (Ps).
Table 3 displays the total variance and the variance of the unforecastable components for 
each schooling level for both NLS/1966 and NLSY/1979. Total variance of the present value 
of college earnings up to age T* increases from 195.9 (NLS/1966) to 292.4 (NLSY/1979). 
This implies an increase of almost 50% in the total variance. The increase is smaller for the 
variance of the present value of high school earnings up to age 36: it goes from 137 in NLS/
1966 to 165 for NSLY/79, an increase of almost 21%.
The variance of the unforecastable components up to age 36 has also increased. For college 
earnings, it is 76.3 in the early cohort and becomes 84.4 in the more recent cohort. For high 
school earnings, it is 31.6 in the NLS/1966 and becomes 48.1 in the NLSY/1979. In 
percentage terms, this implies that the variance of the unforecastable component increased 
10.6% for college and 52% for high school. Table 3 shows that total variance in the present 
value of gross returns to college up to age 36 increased from 611 in NLS/1966 to 823 in 
NLSY/1979, an increase of about 35%. The variance of the unforecastable components 
increased from 167 to 222, or roughly 33%.
The increase in the variance of the unforecastable components of earnings is a key element 
in explaining the increase in the total variance in earnings for high school graduates. It is 
much less of a driving force in explaining the increase in the variance of college earnings.
Figures 2A and 2B plot the densities of realized and unforecastable present values of high 
school earnings for the 1979 and 1966 samples, respectively. Figures 3A and 3B make the 
analogous comparison for present values of college earnings for the 1979 and 1966 samples, 
respectively. Finally, Figures 4A and 4B show the corresponding figures for returns. 
Unforecastable components are a major component of total earnings variance.
Table 3 also presents the total variance and the variance of forecastable components for each 
schooling level for both NLS/1966 and NLSY/1979. In the recent cohort, individuals who 
attend college have become more diverse in predictable ways possibly associated with 
greater possibilities for specialization in the modern economy. There is only a small change 
in the predictability of high school earnings. For college earnings, the variance of 
forecastable components is 119.5 for the NLS/1966 and 207.9 for the NLSY/1979 
corresponding to a 74% increase. For high school earnings, it is 105 for the NLS/1966 and 
117.2 for the NLSY/1979, which implies an increase of only 11%. There is a substantial 
increase in the variance of predictable returns to college for the more recent cohort.
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In summary, our analysis shows that about 8% of the increase in the variability in college 
earnings, 60% of the increase in the variability in high school earnings, and about 26% of 
the increase in the variability of gross returns to college is due to an increase in uncertainty 
in the American labor market. We next turn to an analysis of how the increase in variance is 
apportioned by age.
3.3.2 The Variance of the Unforecastable and Forecastable Components by 
Age—The increase in uncertainty is not uniform across age groups. Figure 5A plots the 
variances of unforecastable components by age in high school earnings in NLS/1966, and 
NLSY/1979. They are flat until age 27/28. A similar pattern characterizes college earnings 
(Figure 5B). After age 27/28, college and high school variances in both cohorts increase 
with age. Until age 36, the NLSY/1979 cohort experiences a much more rapid increase in 
variances with age than does the NLS/1966 cohort. The college sample shows a similar flat 
pattern until age 27. Again, components due to uncertainty increase with age but the only 
divergence between the younger cohort and the older cohort is in the age range 28–31.
The age profile of the variance of forecastable components is different. (See Figures 6A and 
6B.) For both college and high school graduates it rises up to age 27 and then declines 
somewhat. For high school graduates, the increase is greater for the more recent cohort up to 
age 27 but then the two curves coincide. For college graduates, the predictable components 
of variance are uniformly higher at each age for the more recent cohort.
3.3.3 Accounting for Macro Uncertainty—The literature in macroeconomics 
documents that aggregate instability steadily decreased in the post-World War II period prior 
to the 2008 meltdown (see Gordon, 2005). To capture the reduction in macro uncertainty, we 
introduce time dummies into the earnings equation.35 Our tests indicate that the time 
dummies in the ex-post earnings equations do not enter the schooling choice equation. Thus, 
we estimate that macro uncertainty is not forecastable by agents at the time schooling 
choices are made. Macro uncertainty decreased by 90% for later cohorts of high school 
educated workers (see Table 4). Macro shocks have decreased slightly if at all for college 
educated workers. These estimates are consistent with the evidence that US business cycle 
volatility decreased in the years prior to 2008. At the same time, macro uncertainty is a tiny 
fraction of total uncertainty for both cohorts (6.8% for 1966, 3.3% for 1979).
3.3.4 Risk Aversion and More General Market Structures—In deriving the 
estimates presented in this paper, we have assumed risk neutrality and access to credit 
markets. It would be informative to estimate a more general model with risk–averse agents 
trading in incomplete markets. Introducing risk aversion and different credit market 
structures into our analysis raises a general set of questions about the identification of the 
model of CHN.
35We face the standard problem of the lack of simultaneous identification of age, period and cohort effects so we cannot identify 
cohort effects in the presence of age and time effects. Thus our estimates of uncertainty of time effects can also be interpreted as 
estimates of uncertainty of cohort effects. See Heckman and Robb (1985) for a discussion of this problem and a demonstration of the 
interactions that can be identified.
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A basic question, first posed by CHN (2005), is What can be identified in more general 
environments? In the absence of perfect certainty or perfect risk sharing, preferences and 
credit market environments also determine schooling choices. The separation theorem used 
in this paper that allows consumption and schooling decisions to be analyzed in isolation of 
each other breaks down.
If we a priori postulate information arrival processes, and assume that preferences are known 
up to some unknown parameters as in Flavin (1981), Blundell and Preston (1998), and 
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), we can identify departures from specified market 
structures. Flavin (1981), Blundell and Preston (1998), and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 
(2008) specify explicit time series processes for the unobservables (e.g., ARMA or fixed 
effect/AR-1 models) with unknown coefficients but prespecified serial correlation structures 
and assume that the innovations in these processes are the uncertainty components while the 
predictable components are known to agents.36
One can add consumption data to the schooling choice and earnings data to secure 
identification of risk preference parameters (within a parametric family) and information 
sets, and to test among alternative models of market environments. Navarro (2011) analyzes 
consumption and earnings data using a CRRA utility function (assumed to be the same for 
all persons) and an Aiyagari (1994) borrowing constraint. Doing so has substantial effects on 
the educational choices and estimates of the contribution of uncertainty to earnings 
variability. Adding these features substantially reduces the estimated level of uncertainty for 
both college and high school states but especially so for the college state. He estimates that 
fully 81% of the variance in observed college earnings is predicted as opposed to 44% of the 
variance in high school earnings.37
Alternative assumptions about what analysts know produce different interpretations of the 
same evidence. An open question, not yet fully resolved in the literature, is how far one can 
go in nonparametrically jointly identifying preferences, market structures and agent 
information sets. The lack of full insurance interpretation given in the empirical analyses of 
Flavin (1981) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), may instead be a consequence of 
their misspecification of the generating processes of agent information sets.
3.3.5 Accounting for Inequality—Instead of estimating a model with risk aversion, in 
this paper we draw on a large literature on inequality measurement that evaluates alternative 
distributions of earnings using a variety of indices and social welfare functions.38 These 
criteria embody social preferences toward inequality aversion. We contribute to this 
literature by distinguishing the contributions to inequality arising from uncertainty and the 
contributions arising from predictable components. These are measured with respect to 
information sets at the college going age.
36Hansen (1987) shows a fundamental nonidentification result for the Flavin model estimated on aggregate data. Our use of micro 
panel data circumvents the problem he raises.
37Navarro's sample corresponds most closely to our NLSY/1979 sample. He estimates the model for a single cohort and so he does 
not address the issue of the evolution of uncertainty discussed in this paper. He also does not report separate estimates of the effects of 
allowing for risk aversion and adding credit constraints to CHN.
38See Anand (1983), Foster and Sen (1997), Sen (2000), Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000) and Cowell (2000) for surveys of this 
literature.
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We simulate the distribution of the observed present value of age-truncated earnings and 
compute the Gini coefficient, the Theil Entropy Index, and the Atkinson Index under 
different scenarios. For each cohort k, we write earnings of individual i at the time t, 
schooling level s as Yk,i,t. Let Sk,i = 1 if person i graduates college and Sk,i = 0 if person i 
graduates high school. We may write
and
We show that the distribution of Yk,i for each cohort, displayed in the first row of Table 5A 
(for the Gini index), Table 5B (for the Theil index) and Table 5C (for the Atkinson index), 
the NLSY/1979 cohort is more unequal than the NLS/1966 cohort for any inequality 
measurement we use. The Gini coefficient (Table 5A) grows by 16% from the earlier cohort 
to the later cohort.39 Table 5B shows that the Theil Entropy Index T grew by 38% from the 
NLS/1966 to the NLSY/1979. One of the advantages of the Theil Index is that it can be used 
to decompose overall inequality within and between schooling groups. Within group 
inequality grew by 28% and between group inequality grew by 450%.
An explicit social welfare approach to measuring earnings inequality proceeds by 
constructing indexes based on social welfare functions defined over earnings distributions 
(see Cowell, 2000; Foster and Sen, 1997).40 For each cohort k, let μk denote the average 
income level computed over incomes of agents i in all schooling groups,
where nk is the number of persons in our samples of cohort k. Given a social welfare 
function U (Yk,i), the Atkinson index (1970) is defined as the per-capita level of present 
value of income  such that, if equally distributed, would generate the same level of social 
welfare as the distribution of earnings in cohort k. That is, for the social welfare function 
advocated by Atkinson (1970),  satisfies:
39The low level of the Gini coefficient arises from the averaging of incomes that arises in constructing present values, because we 
study of white males only, and from the truncation of the present value term due to data limitations.
40Anand (1983) presents a useful summary of the indices used in this literature.
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The parameter ϵ is a measure of inequality aversion (ϵ = 0 corresponds to no inequality 
aversion; ϵ → − ∞ corresponds to Rawlsian inequality aversion). The Atkinson index A is 
defined as:
Table 5C computes the Atkinson Index for each cohort and its growth, for different values of 
inequality aversion parameter ϵ. Regardless of the value of ϵ, inequality has increased by 
between 40% to 60% according to the Atkinson Index.
Our previous analysis established that some portion of the inequality in observed present 
value of earnings is predictable at the age college decisions are made using the information 
in . We can compare the inequality that is produced by predictable factors (heterogeneity) 
versus overall earnings inequality. This allows us to determine the contribution of 
uncertainty to overall inequality using a variety of measures. We simulate counterfactual 
economies in which uncertainty is eliminated. Eliminating uncertainty can be accomplished 
by simulating an economy in which the unforecastable components are set at their means. 
We could keep schooling choices fixed at their values in the factual economy or allow agents 
to re-optimize and see how that affects these measures of inequality measurement. We do 
both, but differences arising from re-optimized schooling choice are of second order. See the 
tables in Appendix 3.6–3.8. In the text, we report results holding schooling fixed at their 
value in the factual economy.
The second row of Table 5A presents the Gini coefficient for the economy without 
uncertainty in future earnings fixing schooling choices as in the factual economy. In this 
case, the Gini coefficient for the NLS/1966 would be 0.16 and for the NLSY/1979 would be 
0.18, which represents a growth of less than 15% in inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. The analogous calculation for the Theil index reported in Table 5B shows that 
the Overall Theil Index would have grown by 34% if uncertainty were eliminated, while the 
Within and Between Theil Indexes would have grown by 22% and 394%, respectively. The 
analogous exercise for the Atkinson index predicts an increase between 35% and 42% (see 
Table 5C).
These calculations show that rising inequality in the aggregate as measured by conventional 
inequality indices is largely driven by rising heterogeneity. However, as documented in Table 
3, there are sharp differences in the contribution of rising uncertainty to inequality for 
different schooling groups. The rise in high school graduate earnings variability is due to a 
substantial rise in inequality due to uncertainty. Uncertainty in college graduate earnings has 
not increased substantially, although predictable components have become more variable.
4 Summary and Conclusion
This paper investigates the sources of rising wage inequality in the US labor market for 
white males in a period ranging over the mid-1960s to 2005, prior to the 2008 meltdown. We 
find that increasing inequality arises both from increasing micro uncertainty and increasing 
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predictable components of variation. The latter could arise from increased specialization in 
labor markets, but we present no direct evidence on this question. Both predictable and 
unpredictable components of earnings have increased since the mid-1960s. The fraction of 
the variability due to micro uncertainty has increased especially for less skilled workers. 
Aggregate uncertainty decreased prior to the 2008 meltdown, especially for unskilled 
workers. Micro uncertainty dwarfs macro uncertainty. Our evidence of substantially 
increased uncertainty at the micro level for recent cohorts of unskilled labor supports the 
increased turbulence hypothesis of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2008). Conventional 
measures of aggregate inequality do not reveal the substantial contribution of the rise in the 
uncertainty of the earnings of less skilled workers to their observed rise in the inequality of 
their earnings.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. 
Densities of Returns to College
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Figure 2. 
The Densities of Total Residual vs. Unforecastable Components in Present Value of High 
School Earnings
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Figure 3. 
The Densities of Total Residual vs. Unforecastable Components in Present Value of College 
Earnings
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Figure 4. 
The Densities of Total Residual vs. Forecastable Components Returns College vs. High 
School
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Figure 5. 
Profile of Variance of Uncertainty
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Figure 6. 
Profile of Variance of Heterogeneity
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Table 1
Schooling Choice and Rates of Return per Year of College: Comparison Across Cohorts
NLS/66 NLSY/79
High School Graduates 58.17% 64.19%
College Graduates 41.83% 35.81%
Mincer Returns to College1 9.01% 11.96%
Mincer Returns to College2 10.17% 12.41%
Mincer Returns to College3 8.17% 11.00%
1
Pooled OLS Regression, controlling only for Mincer Experience and Mincer Experience Squared
2
Pooled OLS Regression, controlling for Mincer Experience, Mincer Experience Squared, and Year Dummies
3
Pooled OLS Regression, controlling for Mincer Experience, Mincer Experience Squared, Cognitive Skills, Urban and South Residence at Age 14, 
and Year Dummies (Dependent Variable: Log Earnings).
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Table 2
Mean Rates of Return per Year of College by Schooling Group
NLS/66 NLSY/79
Schooling Group Mean Returns Standard Error Mean Returns Standard Error
High School Graduates 0.0592 0.0046 0.0955 0.0063
College Graduates 0.0877 0.0070 0.1355 0.0080
Individuals at the Margin 0.0750 0.0178 0.1184 0.0216
J Labor Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 October 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Cunha and Heckman Page 30
Ta
bl
e 
3
Ev
o
lu
tio
n 
of
 U
nc
er
ta
in
ty
N
LS
/1
96
6
Co
lle
ge
H
ig
h 
Sc
ho
ol
R
et
ur
ns
To
ta
l V
ar
ia
nc
e
19
5.
88
2
13
6.
96
5
61
1.
24
5
Va
ria
nc
e 
of
 U
nf
or
ec
as
ta
bl
e 
Co
m
po
ne
nt
s
76
.3
32
31
.6
15
16
7.
18
7
Va
ria
nc
e 
of
 F
o
re
ca
st
ab
le
 C
om
po
ne
nt
s
11
9.
55
0
10
5.
35
0
44
4.
05
8
N
LS
/1
97
9
Co
lle
ge
H
ig
h 
Sc
ho
ol
R
et
ur
ns
To
ta
l V
ar
ia
nc
e
29
2.
36
8
16
5.
35
0
82
3.
20
0
Va
ria
nc
e 
of
 U
nf
or
ec
as
ta
bl
e 
Co
m
po
ne
nt
s
84
.4
64
48
.1
37
22
1.
97
6
Va
ria
nc
e 
of
 F
o
re
ca
st
ab
le
 C
om
po
ne
nt
s
20
7.
90
4
11
7.
21
4
60
1.
22
3
Ev
o
lu
tio
n
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 In
cr
ea
se
 in
 T
o
ta
l V
ar
ia
nc
e
49
.2
6%
20
.7
2%
34
.6
8%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 In
cr
ea
se
 in
 V
ar
ia
nc
e 
of
 U
nf
or
ec
as
ta
bl
e 
Co
m
po
ne
nt
s
10
.6
5%
52
.2
6%
32
.7
7%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 In
cr
ea
se
 in
 V
ar
ia
nc
e 
of
 F
o
re
ca
st
ab
le
 C
om
po
ne
nt
s
73
.9
0%
11
.2
6%
35
.3
9%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 In
cr
ea
se
 in
 T
o
ta
l V
ar
ia
nc
e 
by
 S
ou
rc
e
Co
lle
ge
H
ig
h 
Sc
ho
ol
R
et
ur
ns
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 In
cr
ea
se
 in
 T
o
ta
l V
ar
ia
nc
e 
du
e 
to
 U
nf
or
ec
as
ta
bl
e 
Co
m
po
ne
nt
s
8.
43
%
58
.2
0%
25
.8
5%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 In
cr
ea
se
 in
 T
o
ta
l V
ar
ia
nc
e 
du
e 
to
 F
o
re
ca
st
ab
le
 C
om
po
ne
nt
s
91
.5
7%
41
.8
0%
74
.1
5%
J Labor Econ. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 October 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Cunha and Heckman Page 31
Table 4
Share of Variance of Business Cycle in Total Variance of Unforecastable Components
NLS/1966 NLSY/1979
Point Estimate Standard Error Point Estimate Standard Error
High School 0.1111 0.0147 0.0156 0.0020
College 0.0452 0.0077 0.0392 0.0052
Overall 0.0679 0.0107 0.0328 0.0042
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Table 5
Predictable Heterogeneity
A. Gini Decomposition
NLS/66 NLSY/79 % Growth
Factual Economy: Predictable Heterogeneity and Uncertainty1 0.1803 0.2088 15.85%
Counterfactual: Predictable Fixing Schooling Choices as in Factual Economy Predictable Heterogeneity 
Only2 0.1591 0.1825 14.73%
B. The Theil Entropy Index T (Overall)
NLS/66 NLSY/79 % Growth
Factual Economy: Predictable Heterogeneity and Uncertainty1 0.0502 0.0693 37.98%
Counterfactual: Fixing Schooling Choices as in Factual Economy Predictable Heterogeneity Only2 0.0390 0.0522 33.76%
Within Schooling Groups
NLS/66 NLSY/79 % Change
Factual Economy: Predictable Heterogeneity and Uncertainty1 0.0491 0.0631 28.53%
Counterfactual: Fixing Schooling Choices as in Factual Economy Predictable Heterogeneity Only2 0.0378 0.0465 22.85%
Between Schooling Groups
NLS/66 NLSY/79 % Change
Factual Economy: Predictable Heterogeneity and Uncertainty1 0.0011 0.0062 447.37%
Counterfactual: Fixing Schooling Choices as in Factual Economy Predictable Heterogeneity Only2 0.0011 0.0057 394.22%
1
Let Yk,s,t,i denote the earnings of an agent i, i = 1, …, nk, at age t, t = 22, …, 36, in schooling level s, s = high school, college, and cohort k,k = 
NLS/1966, NLSY/1979. We model earnings Yk,s,t,i as:
(i)
The present value of earnings at schooling level s, Yk,s,i, is . The observed present value of earnings satisfies Yk,i = 
Sk,iYk,1,i + (1 − Sk,i) Yk,0,i where Sk,i = 1 if agent i in cohort k graduates college, and Sk,i = 0 if the person graduates high school. Let Ck,i 
denote the direct costs for individual i in cohort k. The schooling choice is:
(ii)
This is the factual economy. In this row, we show the inequality measure in the subtitle.
2We simulate the economy by replacing (i) with:
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where  are the individual earnings when idiosyncratic uncertainty is completely shut down. The present value of earnings when only 
heterogeneity is accounted for is constructed in a similar manner: . The schooling choices are as determined in (ii). 
In this row, we show the inequality measure for the concept given in the subtitle for the observed truncated present value of earnings  when 
we constrain schooling choices to be the same as in the economy that generates the first row.
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